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Abstract
Contrary to an oft-made claim, there are observational distinctions be-
tween “many-worlds” quantum theories, in which the quantum state “branches”
without collapsing, and “single-history” quantum theories, in which some-
thing like a single macroscopic history occurs through some process such as
the continual collapse or reduction of the quantum state. The observational
distinctions occur as a result of processes in which observers are created or de-
stroyed. One example is whether you may expect to observe anything within
this universe after a time long compared with your life expectancy. Other
examples are whether we would be expected to observe an expanding uni-
verse today in certain theories of quantum cosmology, or what value we might




Quantum mechanics is so mysterious that its precise content or interpretation
is not agreed upon even by leading physicists. Although the number of versions or
interpretations of quantum mechanics is huge, here I wish to focus upon two main
classes of interpretations, which I shall call \single-history" versions and \many-
worlds" versions, and show how they might be distinguished observationally. (Sim-
ilar observational distinctions can be made between analogous \single-history" and
\many-worlds" versions of classical physics, but since we know that the universe is
quantum, here I shall focus on quantum theories.)
In single-history versions, the quantum formalism gives probabilities for various
alternative sequences of events, but only one choice among the possible alternatives
is assumed to occur in actuality. For example, a wavefunction that gives nonzero
amplitudes for many dierent alternative events may be assumed to undergo a se-
quence of collapses to give a single sequence of actually occurring events, which may
be considered to be a unique history (at least in some macroscopic or coarse-grained
sense). An alternative single-histories interpretation is the Bohm-deBroglie pilot-
wave theory [1], in which the wavefunction never collapses but acts as a pilot wave
to guide in the conguration space a trajectory that may be regarded as the single
actual history of the theory.
On the other hand, the many-worlds versions began with Everett’s relative-
state formalism [2] in which the wavefunction never collapses. In a suitable basis
each component of the wavefunction may be considered to be a dierent \world,"
leading to this interpretation’s being labeled the \many-worlds" interpretation. The
Bohm-deBroglie pilot wave theory may also be extended to a many-worlds version of
quantum mechanics by postulating that not just one but a whole set of trajectories
actually occurs.
The consistent or decohering histories formulation of quantum mechanics [3] does
not by itself imply whether only a single coarse-grained history actually occurs, or
whether many do, say all histories with nonzero probabilities within a single consis-
tent set of histories, so it can be either a single-history or a many-worlds version of
quantum mechanics. This formalism is designed to give the probabilities of individ-
ual coarse-grained histories in any set of consistent histories. These probabilities do
not depend on whether only one, or instead many, of the histories are actual rather
than merely possible. However, in this paper I shall consider probabilities for obser-
vations rather than merely probabilities for histories, so the consistent or decohering
histories formalism needs to be extended in order to calculate these probabilities of
interest here. The extension then depends on whether many, or only one, of the
histories are actual.
It is often claimed that there is no observational distinction between many-world
and single-history versions of a quantum theory [4], but here I shall refute that.
2
In processes in which observers are neither created or destroyed, and in which
observations are remembered, it does seem to be true that there is generally no
distinction that a single observer can make in practice between single-history and
many-worlds quantum theories that are otherwise identical. This is because then
the measure for each observation in a many-world theory is proportional to the prob-
ability of that observation in the corresponding single-history theory. This result
depends upon the lack of interference between \worlds" in which dierent observa-
tions are made, which is assured if the memory records of the dierent observations
are orthogonal.
To circumvent this no-observable-distinction result, David Deutsch [5] has pro-
posed an experiment in which an observer \splits" into two copies which make
dierent observations. The two copies record that they observed (but not what they
observed) and then forget what they observed before being rejoined coherently back
into a single copy. However, this experiment appears to be technologically extremely
challenging.
On the other hand, what I wish to demonstrate here is that if observers are
created or destroyed, so that dierent \worlds" do not have the same observers or
the same types of observations, then the measures for observations in the many-
worlds theory can be dierent from being merely proportional to the probabilities
in the corresponding single-history theory. Then what an observer would be typi-
cally expected to observe in the many-worlds theory can be very improbable within
the corresponding single-history theory, or vice versa, leading to an observational
distinction between the two theories.
One example of an observational distinction between many-world and single-
history quantum theories is what observers should expect to observe when their
destruction has signicant quantum uncertainties. This seems almost certainly to
be the case for human observers on earth [6]. Then in some \worlds," an observer
would have one lifetime, whereas in other \worlds" he or she would have a greatly
dierent lifetime.
It is plausible to make the unproven assumption that human observers on earth
in our present \world" have a very tiny but nonzero measure or probability of living
far beyond their life expectancy [6]. For example, assume that if you are a twentieth
century reader of this paper, the year 2100 is suciently beyond your life expectancy
that in almost all (but not quite all) \worlds," you will be dead then. Therefore, in
a single-history quantum theory it would be very improbable for you to nd yourself
alive in 2100. On the other hand, in a many-worlds quantum theory I predict there
will be some \worlds" in which you are alive then and remember my prediction.
Thus, if you are alive in the year 2100 in this universe and remember my predic-
tion that you indeed will be, this will be strong evidence for a many-worlds quantum
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theory rather than for a single-history theory, since by the assumptions above, in a
single-history theory it would be very improbable for the single existing \world" in
the year 2100 to have you alive in it.
I rst heard this bizarre prediction of many-worlds quantum theory from Edward
Teller [7], but he seemed to regard it as a reductio ad absurdum, which I do not.
The longer one waits into the future, the smaller the quantum mechanical mea-
sure (e.g., expectation value) for an observer alive at the end of the twentieth century
to be alive then, but presumably this measure never drops precisely to zero at any
nite time. One might summarize this gradual diminishment of the measure for the
continued existence of an observer in many-worlds quantum theory by saying, \Old
observers never die; they just fade away."
The prediction of this section has the advantage of being testable by each of
you (at least if a many-worlds theory is correct; if instead a single-history theory is
correct, that alternative would not be observationally conrmed within this universe
by the failure of the prediction to come true, because then you would be dead
and presumably not conscious within this universe of the failure of the prediction).
However, the prediction does have the disadvantage of requiring a long wait.
One could attempt to speed up the test by trying to perform Deutsch’s proposed
experiment [5] mentioned above, but I doubt that this experiment could be per-
formed before the year 2100, if ever, so it might not be any faster than just waiting
for my prediction to be fullled. Another attempt to speed up the test would be to
try something like Russian roulette [6, 8] a large number of times, assuming that its
randomness can be traced to quantum mechanical fluctuations: If a many-worlds
theory is correct, there would almost certainly be a \world" in which you survived,
but if a single-history theory is correct, after pulling the trigger many times, you
would most likely no longer be alive at all (at least within this universe). However,
this Letter should not be interpreted as recommending such an unethical experiment.
An ethical way to try to nd observational evidence in the near future to distin-
guish between many-worlds and single-history quantum theories would be to look
at the dierent eects of such theories, not on the destruction of observers, but on
their creation.
Consider a theory of quantum cosmology that gives a quantum state for the
universe in which there are dierent \worlds" with greatly dierent numbers of ob-
servers. For calculating how typical various observations are, in a single-history
theory one should weight the \worlds" purely by how probable they are, but in
a many-worlds theory, one should weight the \worlds" not only by their quantum
mechanical measures (the analogue in a deterministic many-worlds theory of the
probabilities in an indeterministic single-histories theory), but also by how much
observation occurs within each \world." This distinction leads to dierent predic-
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tions as to which observations would be typical within the two types of theories.
As a grossly oversimplied illustrative example, consider the example in which
a quantum cosmology theory gave a quantum state (before any possible collapse)
that had one \world" (e.g., one macroscopic component of the wavefunction, or
one decohering coarse-grained history) with observers, and a second one with none.
Suppose that the rst \world" had a measure of 0.0000000001 and the second one
had a measure of 0.9999999999.
In the single-history version of this theory, these two normalized measures would
be the probabilities for the two \worlds," so the probability would be extremely low
that this theory led to any observers. A non-null observation would thus have such
a low likelihood within this single-history theory that it would be strong evidence
against this theory.
On the other hand, in the many-worlds version of this theory, both \worlds"
would exist, with the measures indicating something like the \amount" by which
they exist. But since the observations that occur in the rst \world" denitely exist
within this many-worlds theory as realities and not just as possibilities, the existence
of an observation is not evidence against this many-worlds theory.
To put it another way, for considering observations within a many-worlds theory,
one must multiply the measure for each world by a measure for the observations
within that world. (Crudely, one may use the number of observations within the
world, though in a nal theory I would expect a renement, so that, for example,
a human’s observation is weighted more heavily than an ant’s). When one does
this for the example quantum cosmology theory above, the rst \world" makes up
the entirety of the weighting in the many-worlds theory, even though in the single-
history theory that \world" has an extremely low probability and would be quite
unexpected.
Now consider a second toy quantum cosmology theory in which there are two
\worlds" that both have observers, but their numbers and observations dier. For
example, let World A last just barely long enough for it to have 1010 observers, all
during the recontracting stage fairly near a big crunch, and let World B last much
longer than the age range at which observers occur and have 1090 observers when
the universe is expanding. Suppose World A has measure almost unity and World
B has measure 10−30.
In the single-history version of this theory, these (normalized) measures are prob-
abilities, so with near certainty, we can deduce that we should be in World A and see
a contracting universe in this theory. Our actual observation of an expanding uni-
verse would then be strong evidence against this single-history quantum cosmology
theory.
On the other hand, in the many-worlds version of this theory, all of the obser-
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vations actually exist. To calculate which observations are typical, one needs the
measures for the observations themselves. Presumably these are given by the ex-
pectation values of certain operators associated with the corresponding observations
[9]. Crudely one might suppose the total for all the observations within one \world"
is roughly proportional to the number of observers within that \world," multiplied
by the measure for the \world." At this level of approximation, the total measure
for the observations in the many-worlds version of this second toy model is thus 1010
for World A and 1060 for World B. Therefore, an observation chosen at random in
this many-worlds theory is 1050 more likely to be from World B, with the universe
observed to be expanding, than from World A with the universe seen to be con-
tracting. Our actual observation of an expanding universe would then be consistent
with this theory.
Thus in this second toy cosmological model, we can reject its single-history ver-
sion because of the low probability it gives, not for our existence this time, but for
whether we see the universe expanding. In this way observations can in principle be
used to distinguish between many-worlds and single-history quantum theories, even
if those dierent theories give the same set of quantum measures for their various
\worlds."
There is the challenge that at present we apparently do not know enough about
the quantum state of the universe to say with certainty whether our observations
favor a many-worlds theory or a single-history theory. Nevertheless, I can summarize
some highly speculative evidence that gives a preliminary suggestion that a many-
histories theory might be observationally favored.
This evidence starts with the Hartle-Hawking ‘no-boundary’ proposal for the
quantum state of the universe [10], which of course is quite speculative but seems
to me to be the most elegant sketch so far of a proposal (certainly not technically
complete at present) for the quantum state of the universe. Under certain unproven
assumptions and approximations, in a homogeneous, isotropic three-sphere minisu-
perspace toy model with a single massive inflaton scalar eld, the no-boundary pro-
posal leads in the semiclassical regime to a set of \worlds" or macroscopic classical
spacetimes that are Friedmann-Robertson-Walker universes with various amounts
of inflation and hence various total lifetimes and maximum sizes, and with mea-
sure approximately proportional to epia
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0 , where a0 is the radius of the Euclidean
four-dimensional hemisphere where the solution nucleates [10].
This nucleating radius a0 is inversely proportional to the initial value of the infla-
ton scalar eld, multiplied by its mass m in Planck units, whereas the growth factor
during inflation, and the lifetime of the resulting Friedmann-Robertson-Walker uni-
verse, go exponentially with the square of the initial value of the inflaton scalar
eld. Therefore, if one works out the quantum measure in terms of the volume of
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the universe at the end of inflation (say V in Planck units), one nds that at the tree
level it is very roughly proportional to exp [(4.5pi/m2)/(ln m3V + 1.5 ln ln m3V )] for
large values of m3V (the universe lifetime in units of the Compton wavelength of
the inflaton scalar eld).
Since the mass m is very small in Planck units, say roughly 10−6 [11], the factor
of 4.5pi/m2 is very large, say roughly 1013, and one gets an utterly enormous expo-
nential peak in the measure at relatively small values of m3V . (There is a cuto in
m3V at a value of order unity, below which there is no inflationary solution [12], so
the measure distribution does not actually have a divergence, but the exponential
of an argument of order 1013 is a rather large number even if it is not innite.) The
expression above for the measure rapidly decreases with increasing lifetime and then
flattens out to become asymptotically constant when m3V gets large in comparison
with exp (4.5pi/m2).
If one takes at face value the expression above for the measure for all values
of m3V above its lower cuto (at some number of order unity), then although the
measure has an utterly enormous exponential peak at small values of m3V , this is
in turn overwhelmed by the divergence one gets when one integrates the measure
(actually a measure density) to innite values of m3V . Then the total measure would
be completely dominated by universes with arbitrarily large amounts of inflation.
This means that with unit normalized probability, our universe would be arbitrarily
large and arbitrarily flat when one ignores density fluctuations from corrections to
the homogeneous isotropic minisuperspace model [13].
However, the expression above for the measure is purely at the tree-level or zero-
loop approximation, ignoring prefactors that are expected to distort the measure
distribution signicantly for m3V large in comparison with exp (4.5pi/m2), because
these enormous universes are generated by inflation that starts with the inflaton
potential exceeding the Planck density, where one cannot trust the tree-level ap-
proximation or any other approximation we have at present.
If the correct quantum measure distribution diverges when one integrates to
innity the spatial volume shortly after the end of inflation, then the universe is
most probably arbitrarily large and very near the critical density (spatially very
flat), whether a many-worlds or a single-history quantum theory is correct, and so
our observation of a universe near the critical density would not distinguish between
the two possibilities.
However, if the correct quantum measure density is cut o for large initial val-
ues of the inflaton energy density so that one does not get arbitrarily large uni-
verses with certainty, then the enormous exponential peak in the distribution at
small universes is likely to dominate and (in a single-history version in which the
quantum state collapses to a single macroscopic Friedmann-Robertson-Walker uni-
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verse) make the universe most probably have only a small amount of inflation and
a very short lifetime, not sucient to produce observers, like the rst world in the
rst example above. If one said that somehow the quantum state collapsed to a
Friedmann-Robertson-Walker universe that gets large enough for observers, then
the most probable one under this requirement would be one that lasts just barely
long enough for observers before the nal big crunch. In this case the observers
would most likely exist only near the end of the universe, when it is recollapsing,
like World A in the second example above, which is contrary to our observations of
an expanding universe. Thus a single-history version of this theory with the quan-
tum measure cut o to produce a normalizable probability distribution would most
likely be refuted by our observations of an expanding universe.
On the other hand, if one took a many-worlds version of this quantum cosmology
theory, one would have to weight the \worlds" (classical universes) by something
like the number of observers within them. One would expect this number to be
proportional to the volume of space at the time and other conditions when observers
can exist (other factors being equal) [14]. Therefore, in the many-worlds version one
would multiply the quantum measure given above for the \worlds" (the \bare"
probability distribution for universe congurations [15]) by something like V to get
the measure for observations (the \observational" probability distribution [15]).
The result, V exp [(4.5pi/m2)/(lnm3V + 1.5 ln ln m3V )], is then suciently rapidly
rising with large m3V that the part with large m3V , even if cut o at m3V of order
exp (4.5pi/m2), dominates over the exponentially large peak near the minimum value
of m3V . As argued in [15], there is thus enough space for the no-boundary proposal
to be consistent with our observations of a large and expanding universe, but this
argument implicitly assumed a many-worlds version of the no-boundary proposal.
Similar arguments had been given earlier in the broader context of eternal stochastic
inflation [14], but these arguments also implicitly assumed a many-worlds version
of quantum theory. In a single-history version, it seems plausible that the Hartle-
Hawking ‘no-boundary’ quantum state may collapse with nearly unit probability to
a classical universe conguration that only lasts of the order of the Compton wave-
length of the inflaton scalar eld, presumably far too short to be consistent with our
observations.
This suggestive evidence against a single-history quantum cosmology theory is
of course not yet conclusive, since we do not yet know what the quantum state of
the universe is. Indeed, the ‘tunneling’ wavefunction proposal of Vilenkin, Linde,
and others [16] predicts that the \bare" quantum measure for small universes is
exponentially suppressed, rather than enhanced as discussed above for the Hartle-
Hawking ‘no-boundary’ proposal. This ‘tunneling’ proposal would thus apparently
be consistent with our observations whether one used a many-worlds version or a
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single-history version. But the possibility is open that increased theoretical under-
standing of quantum cosmology may lead us to favor a quantum theory, such as
the ‘no-boundary’ one may turn out to be when it is better understood, that is
consistent with our observations only in its many-worlds version rather than in its
single-history version.
Another tentative piece of observational evidence in favor of many-worlds quan-
tum theory is a comparison with the calculation [17] of likely values of the cosmolog-
ical constant. If the assumptions of that paper are correct, and if the \subuniverses"
used there are the \worlds" used here (\terms in the state vector" [17]) rather than
dierent spacetime regions within one \world" (\local bangs" [17]), then our ob-
servational evidence of the cosmological constant is consistent with many-worlds
quantum theory but not with single-history quantum theory. However, we need a
better understanding of physics to know whether the assumptions are correct (such
as the assumption that \the cosmological constant takes a variety of values in dif-
ferent ‘subuniverses’ " [17]).
Therefore, it may turn out, when we better understand fundamental physics
and quantum cosmology, that the observational evidence of the expansion of the
universe and of the cosmological constant may lead us to favor many-world quantum
theories over single-history quantum theories, without having to wait a time long in
comparison with our life expectancies for the evidence of our continued existence to
favor many-world theories.
I am grateful for very helpful discussions with Jim Hartle. This research was
supported in part by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of
Canada.
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